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This article studies the role of pricing as a signal of environmental
performance for polluting products to green consumers. It is shown
that high environmental performance is signaled through a high price
when less polluting products are more costly to produce. Conse-
quently, the level of pollution is distorted downward relative to what
would prevail under full information.
Keywords: Environmental Performance, Pollution, Quality, Sig-
naling.
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Signaling the Environmental
Performance of Polluting Products to
Green Consumers
1 Introduction
In recent years, there has been a noticeable increase in the number of products
claiming that they are green, i. e., products that generate less environ-
mental harm, especially in the United States and Europe. Examples given
by Cason and Gangadharan (2002) include sustainable forestry, electricity
generated from renewable resources, organically grown agricultural products
and can be extended to hybrid cars, dolphin-safe tuna, biodegradable washing
powders, etc. As pointed by recent papers in the environmental economics
literature, many green products are introduced by rms possessing market
power such as Unilever, Toyota, Honda or MacDonalds1. This is not surpris-
ing since environmentally friendly labels, or eco-labels, can be regarded as
e¤ective instruments in the hands of rms for di¤erentiating their products
from conventionally produced substitutes, hence increasing market power.
Firms infatuation for green claims suggests that they are more and more
1These examples can be found in Deltas, Khanna and Ramirez (2004). See also Innes
and Bial (2002) for the reformulated gasoline ARCO, and Nimon and Beghin (1999) for
an applied work producing empirical evidence on the existence of price premiums in the
U. S. green apparel market which is dominated by one large rm.
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willing to become or, at least, be perceived as environmentally friendly. Nev-
ertheless, there is a suspicion that green claims alone fail to transmit all
information about the environmental performance of newly introduced prod-
ucts to consumers. There are a variety of reasons for this.
A rst reason is that many new products of an allegedely superior quality
passe through an introductory phase, in which consumers can hardly ascer-
tain the quality in question. Since Nelson (1970), this type of products are
the so-called experience goods. Green products that boast about their
high environmental quality are also susceptible to asymmetric informational
problem in their introductory phase (see Karl and Orwat (1999)). More par-
ticularly, when they present multi-dimensional environmental characteristics
and/or are introduced rapidly as is now the case2, which makes it di¢ cult
to thoroughly regulate all environmental claims in advertising and packag-
ing. These claims range from vague statements such as those reviewed by
Iyer and Bannerjee (1993)3 to more or less simplistic voluntary eco-label
schemes4 and standards imposed by the guidelines of Trade Commissions
such as the Federal Trade Commission in the United States or the Trade
Practices Commission in Australia. As observed by Cason and Gangadha-
2For example, 800 new organic products were introduced in the rst half of 2000 in
the US, from the organic farming websites of the US Department of Agriculture, Recent
Growth Patterns in the US Organic Foods Market, 2004, Carolyn Dimitri and Catherine
Green.
3For instance, Brand X is environmentally friendly.
4See Church (1994) for a criticism.
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ran (2002), these guidelines di¤er in stringency from one state or country to
another. The patchwork of standards in the various certication programs is
likely to cause informational problem. Even though it is recognized that eco-
labeling systems partially convey veriable information, the assumption that
they fail to transmit all information about the environmental performance
of products is likely to be met in reality. This paper investigates another
natural way for rms to transmit information, namely, price.
A second reason why consumers may lack information on the environmen-
tal performance of products is that communication of accurate information
is very costly. Investigating and enforcing reasonably truthful environmen-
tal claims requires an environmental agency to not only employ regulations
and civil enforcement procedures but also impose strong penalties for mis-
representation. The discriminatory contracts which should be used by the
regulator as means of providing rms with the correct incentives for fully re-
porting their information may be hardly acceptable from a legal and political
point of view. Furthermore, information on the environmental performance
of products provided by private systems may not be veriable to third par-
ties. If the court nds it hard to determine whether a product or a process
is clean or dirty, then consumers must lend few credence to environmental
statements made by rms, since they cannot be enforced.
Finally, a third reason why consumers may not be accurately informed
about the environmental performance of green products is that they are re-
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moved from the production process. Firms would be expected to have better
information regarding the substitution possibility of cleaner technologies than
would consumers. The latter usually lack the technical knowledge required
for assessing the true environmental costs of inputs or other idiosynchratic
characteristics of the production process. Hence, a rm is likely to be more
aware than consumers of the least-cost combination of inputs that preserves
best the environment.
The purpose of this paper is to study the role of pricing as a signal of envi-
ronmental performance. For this, a powerful rm is assumed to have private
information about the environmental performance of its product. The main
result is that high environmental performance is signaled through a high
price when marginal production costs increase with environmental perfor-
mance. The intuition can be set out as follows. When higher environmental
performance is more expensive to produce, a clean rm has less to lose than
a dirty rm from output reduction. Hence, a clean rm is better o¤ sig-
naling high environmental performance with a high price instead of a low
one. A high price means good news for the environment, not only because
it fully reveals cleanness, but also because, to prove this cleanness, the rm
must shrink emissions below the level that would prevail if environmental
performance were perfectly observable to consumers.
In the present model, pollution is taken to be a non excludable bad in
consumption and consumers are assumed to be environmentally aware in the
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sense that they are willing to pay more for cleaner products. This is remi-
niscent of a recent theoretical literature in which environmental friendliness
is considered as a vertical attribute of products (Arora and Gangopadhyay
((1995), Cremer and Thisse (1999), Bansal and Gangopadhyay (2003), Boyer,
Mahenc and Moreaux (2004)). The willingness to pay for environmental at-
tributes through consumption obey various motives: not only purely private
motives such as health care, but also impurely altruistic motives such as
the guilt complex from purchasing polluting goods, which is quite similar to
what Andreoni (1995) calls a cold prickle5. The marketing research has
produced various evidence that consumers are willing to pay more for envi-
ronmental friendly products. For instance, polls reveal some willingness to
pay more for products that are biodegradable and have recyclable packaging
(see Cairncross (1992) and Cason and Gangadharan (2002)).
The result here that prices signaling high environmental performance are
biased upward when it is more expensive to produce is a clear generaliza-
tion of the familiar result in industrial organization that high prices signal
high product quality (Milgrom and Roberts (1986) or Bagwell and Riordan
(1991)). This is not surprising since both conclusions crucially hinge on the
fairly close assumptions that a cleaner product and a higher-quality product
are both more costly to produce. Consequently, the output restriction asso-
5Such an altruism is said impurebecause, rather than care about the welfare of other
people, individuals care about the act of doing bad for other people .
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ciated with an increase in price is less damaging to a cleaner product as it
is to a higher-quality product. Similarly, the temptation for dirtier produc-
ers to mimic cleaner producers parallels the argument in Schmalensee (1978)
that a natural way for low-quality producers to pretend that quality is high
is to duplicate the prices charged by high-quality producers (see also Tirole
(1988), p. 110-111).
The main di¤erence between the present model and those dealing with
the signaling of product quality is that consumerswillingness to pay for
a product is a¤ected here by the total level of pollution associated with
output. Industrial organization usually treats quantity and quality as inde-
pendent decision variables. In contrast, quantity and environmental quality
are necessarily linked through a pollutant emissions function.
The paper is organized in three sections including the present introduc-
tion. Section II presents the basic model under complete information. The
extension to a signaling model with a continuum of types is analyzed in Sec-
tion III, which states the existence of separating equilibria. Conclusions are
drawn in Section IV.
2 Basic model under complete information
Consider a rm which produces an amount q of a good that generates a
level e of pollution, either during the production process or through its use.
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The environmental friendliness of the product is measured by the emission
function e  t(q)=, where  is an index for the environmental performance:
a higher  means a cleaner product6. The emission function is taken to
be increasing and convex in q, that is, t(0) = 0; t0(q) > 0 and t00(q)  0,
where primes denote derivatives: the greater the output, the more pollu-
tion and, as the pollution emissions increase, larger and larger quantities of
good must be given up to achieve unit reductions in pollution. The tech-
nological process is described by the cost function c(q; ), with c(0; ) = 0;
c(q; ) > 0; cq(q; ) > 0 and cqq(q; )  0, where subscripts denote partial
derivatives (here and throughout), that is, production costs depend upon the
environmental performance of the product, pollution abatement is increas-
ingly costly and marginal production costs are nondecreasing.
Two alternative assumptions are then possible on the relationship be-
tween environmental performance and the productivity of the rm: environ-
mental performance either raises or reduces marginal costs, i. e., cq(q; ) > 0
and cq(q; ) < 0, respectively. We will focus on the rst notion, which is the
most traditional hypothesis in the environmental economics literature (see
Palmer, Oates and Portney (1995)). However, it will be pointed out how the
results change with the alternative hypothesis promoted by Porter and Van
6Note that the relation between output and emissions is often assumed to be xed in
the environmental literature (see, for example, Baumol and Oates (1988, p. 222), Kolstad
(2000, p. 125), Innes and Bial (2002)), in which case  measures the release of pollutants
such as NOx, CO, SO2, per unit of product.
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der Linde (1995) that products of higher environmental quality are cheaper
to produce7.
Consumers want the good but they dont want to be harmed by pollution.
They are assumed to be environmentally aware. They value environmental
friendliness as a vertical attribute of the purchased product in the sense that
they are willing to pay more for a cleaner product. Pollution is considered to
be non-excludable and so everyone consumes it to the same degree. Generally,
polluting emissions create both social and private costs. The social cost V (e)
is the global environmental damage a¤ecting all individuals whether they
consume or not the product. Let v(e) denote the private cost, that is, a
personal damage caused by pollution, such as the adverse e¤ects on health of
ingesting polluted air and water, eating food containing chemical or exposing
the organism to toxic substances. Obviously, the negative utility due to
pollution is more than o¤set against the utility given by the polluting goods
to consumers, otherwise they would not buy. Another interpretation for the
private cost of pollution is reminiscent of Andreoni (1995): consumers lose
intrinsic utility from purchasing a polluting good because they have a cold-
prickle feeling. Along this line, v(e) represents the guilt from consuming a
good that has not been produced in a sustainable manner. It will be assumed
here that the social and private costs enter consumers utility function in a
7Porter and Van der Linde (1995) present a series of case studies rather than propose
a formal model to illustrate this viewpoint.
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separable way.
Consumers buy at most one unit of the product at price p. They are het-
erogeneous in their basic willingness to pay for the product but homogeneous
in their valuation of the damage caused by pollution. The global environ-
mental damage is the same for buyers and non-buyers, hence will not play
any role in the analysis. All buyers lose the same intrinsic utility v(e) from
purchasing the polluting product. Thus, a buyer of type r has a willingness
to pay r   v(e)   V (e) for one unit of the product, while a non-buyer has
utility  V (e). It is assumed that v(0) = 0; v0(e) > 0 and v00(e)  0, that
is, consumers are willing to pay a higher price for a product that generates
less environmental harm and the marginal damage is increasingly harmful.
Writing v(e) = v(t(q)), the function v(:) can be related to unfavorable
atmosphere functions, as dened by Meade (1952): due to external disec-
onomies, the utility that a user derives from consumption decreases with the
total amount of product. In this section, consumers perfectly know the rm
emission function t(q)=.
The basic willingness to pay, r, is assumed to be uniformly distributed
over [0; R], with R > 0. Letting er (p; ) denote the marginal consumer who
is indi¤erent between buying or not, er (p; ) solves the following equation for
r inside [0; R]:
r   v(t(R  r)=)  p = 0: (1)
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From the Implicit Function Theorem, er (p; ) is continuously di¤erentiable
and the rst-order e¤ect of p is given by:
erp (p; ) = (1 + v0(t(R  r)=)t0(R  r)=) 1 : (2)
It can be checked that, under our assumptions, the market area is always
strictly lower than R, and so boundary problems are avoided8. The demand
for the product is equal to the number of consumers with basic willingness
to pay r such that r 2 [er (p; ) ; R]. Normalizing the size of the population
of consumers to 1, this yields a demand function D(p; )  R   er (p; ) and
the rm earns prots equal to
 (p; )  pD(p; )  c(D(p; ); ): (3)
Let  ()   Dp(p; )p=D(p; ) denote the price elasticity of demand and
p() the prot maximizing price. Further, assume  () > 1;8p; ; to ensure
the existence of an interior solution.
Lemma 1: The rm charges the price satisfying p
() cq(D( p(););)
p() =
1
()
:
Proof : (see Appendix 1)
8Indeed, p =  v[t(R=)] and r = 0 solve equation (1). As erp (p; ) > 0, er (0; ) > 0 ander (p; ) > 0 for all p inside [0; R]. The function er (p; ) is monotonically increasing in p,
reaching the maximum value at er (R; ) = R and so, the market area R er (p; ) is strictly
lower than R for all p < R.
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Lemma 1 records the standard result that, under complete information,
the Lerner index is equal to the inverse of the price elasticity of demand:
the rm power is a decreasing function of price elasticity of demand. In the
present context, if price elasticity decreases with , cleanness is a source of
market power since it makes demand less elastic.
3 A signaling model of environmental perfor-
mance
Consider now that the environmental performance of the product is not ob-
servable to consumers by assuming that the index  is private information of
the rm. Environmental performance is assumed to be determined by nature
and is thus exogenous to the rm. After observing the price set by the rm,
consumers rely on their inferences b about the true index  to make their
purchase decision. The rm, in turn, must take into account how its choice of
price inuences consumersinferences. Employing the concept of sequential
equilibrium, we restrict attention to separating equilibria in which clean and
dirty rms choose di¤erent prices, and so the private information on envi-
ronmental performance is revealed. The setting and the proof techniques in
Mailath (1987) are readily adapted for this purpose.
In any equilibrium, the rm optimally chooses the price p, expecting
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consumers to make purchase decisions that maximize their expected utility
given their beliefs. By denition, these beliefs leave no uncertainty about
the rm environmental performance in a separating equilibrium. Following
Mailath (1987), there is no need to specify consumersprior beliefs for the
analysis of separating equilibria. Dening D(p;b) as the demand function
D(p; ) where  = b stands now for consumersinferences, let  p; ;b 
pD(p;b) c(D(p;b); ) be the reduced form prot function for a rm of type ,
anticipating the purchase decision of consumers who draw inferences b upon
seeing p. The set of types is assumed to be a compact interval

; 
  R+.
It can be checked that four conditions on  are satised, which guarantee
the existence of separating equilibria (see Mailath (1987)):
1. 

p; ;b is twice continuously di¤erentiable on R+  ; 2.
2. 8p > cq(D(p;b); ); b < 0:
Indeed, b =

p  cq(D(p;b); )Db p;b and di¤erentiating (1) with
respect to r and  yields, for  = b, Db p;b = (R  er p;b)v0(t(R er p;b)=b)t(R  er p;b)=b(b+ v0(t(R  er p;b)=b)t0(R  er p;b)),
which is strictly positive.
3. p

p; ;b is a strictly monotonic function of .
Straightforward calculations give that p

p; ;b =  cq(D(p;b); )Dp p;b.
Hence, p is of the same sign as cq:
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4.  b

p; ;b =p p; ;b is a strictly monotonic function of .
Di¤erentiating  b

p; ;b =p p; ;b with respect to  yields
p

p; ;b b p; ;b  p p; ;b b p; ;b
p

p; ;b2
= cq(D(p;b); )Db p;b D(p;b)
p

p; ;b2
As Db

p;b is strictly negative, the latter expression has the same sign
as cq(D(p;b); ).
From Theorem 3 in Mailath (1987), conditions 1-4 are necessary and
su¢ cient for the existence of separating equilibria. Condition 2 indicates
that the rm prefers to be perceived as clean when it prices above mar-
ginal cost. A straightforward consequence of this condition is that  is the
worst inference consumers may draw, from the rm point of view, regardless
of its true environmental performance. Condition 3 states that the prof-
itability of changing price crucially depends on whether marginal production
costs increase or decline with environmental performance. The protability
of raising price increases in true environmental cleanness when clean prod-
ucts are more costly to produce than dirty products. Condition 4 is the
familiar single crossing property which means here that the relationship be-
tween environmental and productive e¢ ciencies determines the monotonicity
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of  b

p; ;b =p p; ;b with respect to , that is, the marginal rate of
substitution between price and perceived performance. In other words, for a
given decrease in perceived environmental cleanness, a cleaner rm is always
more willing than a dirtier one to raise price and lower sales volume, to the
extent that cleaner products are more costly to produce.
Let us now turn to the derivation of separating equilibria. A general
treatment can be found in Mailath (1987) and the interested reader is referred
to this article for the essential details. Let ' :

; 
 ! R+ denote an
equilibrium strategy for the rm, hence ' 1(p) is the consumersinference
about the environmental performance of the product after observing p. For
' to be an optimal strategy, it must satisfy strict incentive compatibility:
'() = arg max
p2'([;])

 
p; ; ' 1(p)

;8 2 ;  : (4)
No rm of type  should have an incentive to charge a price other than
the prescribed equilibrium price '().
Lemma 2 reports that there is an absence of distortion at the bottom,
namely the most polluting rm is better o¤ charging its full information
monopoly price.
Lemma 2: Under conditions 1-4, '() = p() in any separating equi-
librium.
Proof : (see Appendix 2)
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To achieve separation, there is no need for the most polluting rm to
distort its price relative to that under full information.
The rm maximization problem given in (4) can be rewritten as choos-
ing b to maximize (;b)   '(b); ;b. The following local incentive
compatibility condition must hold, for all ,
b (; ) = 0: (5)
Otherwise a rm of environmental index  could charge the same price as
a rm of an index arbitrarily nearby and earn a strictly higher prot. Writing
out this equation,
d'()
d
=
 b ('(); ; )
p ('(); ; )
(6)
Let us now show that all types of rm, except the most polluting one, will
distort their price upward and their level of pollution downward compared
to the full information case. This result is recorded in Proposition 1 and a
proof can be found in Appendix 3. It turns out that d'()
d
and cq(D(p;b); )
have the same sign.
Proposition 1: Suppose conditions 1-4 hold so that a separating price
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equilibrium with '() > cq(D('();b); ) exists.
If cq(D(p;b); ) > 0, then d'()d > 0; '() > p()
and t(D('(); )) < t(D(p(); ));8 2 [; ):
Proposition 1 states the following result. When marginal costs increase
with environmental cleanness, it is possible for rms to signal their envi-
ronmental friendliness with prices that rise with the product environmental
performance. Consumers in turn infer higher environmental performances
from higher prices. Given an equilibrium price above marginal cost, using
the rst order condition (6) and condition 2 yields p ('(); ; ) < 0. As
a result, rms, except the most polluting one, signal cleaner products with
prices that are above the full information price. Moreover, producing to meet
the lower quantity demand biases the level of pollution downward relative to
that under full information.
Intuitively, when cq(D(p;b); ) > 0, cleaner rms benet less from pollu-
tion. Hence, they are more willing than dirtier rms to raise price and restrict
output. Over-pricing is the actual means of separation because the forgone
prot from raising price, hence reducing production, is less for cleaner rms.
Thus, signaling a clean product induces a rm to pollute less than under
full information. In the presence of asymmetric information about the en-
vironmental performance of a product, the signaling activity of imperfectly
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competitive rms is potentially a third source of market failure adding to
those pointed out by Buchanan (1969), due respectively to the externality
and excessive market power.
Now suppose that government labeling programs succeed in resolving
consumersuncertainty, say by providing rms with the correct incentives
for fully reporting their information9. This might lead to higher levels of
pollution than those resulting from the signaling behavior of rms. A sin-
gle policy instrument may, at the same time, mitigate one ine¢ ciency by
fully revealing information to consumers and worsen another one by induc-
ing rms to pollute more. Market failures cannot be separately overcome.
A benevolent regulator would be faced here with three potential distortions:
one is the distortion due to the externality, another one is the bias in price
and production associated with the exercise of market power, and the third
one is the informational distortion. Following Tinbergen (1956) and more
recently La¤ont (1994) and Lewis (1996), three policy instruments would
then be required to achieve social e¢ ciency: a Pigouvian tax on pollutant
emissions to internalize the costs of pollution, a subsidy or a tax depending
on the rm tendency to over- or under-price and a lump sum transfer to
mitigate the rent of asymmetric information. Careful research is needed to
address such a question in the present context.
9For instance, the regulator could allow rms to select a price-transfer contract from a
carefully designed menu of such contracts in the spirit of Lewis and Sappington (1988).
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Finally, if cleaner products were also cheaper to produce as advocated by
Porter and Van der Linde (1995), that is, cq(D(p;b); ) < 0, then cleaner
rms would nd a higher price relatively less attractive than would dirtier
rms. Thus, the outcome would be in the opposite direction to that stated
in Proposition 1. To signal environmental performance, a cleaner rm should
distort its price downward and its level of pollution upward relative to what
would prevail under full information.
4 Conclusion
This article has investigated the signaling role of price for a rm endowed
with superior information about the environmental performance of a newly
introduced product. To t one essential feature of green markets, the model
assumes that consumerswillingness to pay for the product is a¤ected by the
total level of pollution associated with the product.
Separating price equilibria are shown to exist due to some essential struc-
tural properties of the model: rst, the rm prefers consumers to believe
its product more likely to be clean regardless of its true environmental per-
formance, and second, the types of the rm can be ordered in such a way
that a clean rm is more willing to change price than is a dirty rm. The
main result is that prices are distorted relative to the full information level in
order to credibly signal high environmental performance. In particular, the
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price distortion goes upward when marginal costs increase with environmen-
tal cleanness, and so the rm polluting emissions level is lower than what
would prevail under full information.
Although the present result emphasizes the role of prices as possible sig-
nals of environmental performance, it cannot dismiss other decision variables
that may potentially be used as signals of environmental friendliness. An
obvious one is advertising10 provided that, either it has direct informational
content, or advertising expenditures are observable. More generally, any
observable expenditure that is likely to improve consumerswillingness to
pay, such as a green technology investment for the sake of meeting eco-
labeling requirements, is candidate to signal environmental performance. As
the present model shares some structural properties with traditional price
signaling models of quality, we can draw on recent ndings of this literature
to get some intuition on the relationship between price and another variable
being used simultaneously to signal environmental performance. Important
results reviewed in Bagwell (2005) (see also Overgaard (1991)) suggest that,
if observable expenditures enhance demand, then a clean rm might signal
environmental performance simultaneously with a price higher and expendi-
tures lower than the levels that would prevail under complete information.
Hence, there is theoretical evidence that signaling distortions in price
and pollution arise due to consumersmisinformation about the true envi-
10This was suggested by one referee.
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ronmental performance of newly introduced products. Obviously, further
empirical research is needed to estimate the size of these signaling distor-
tions and the magnitude of the e¢ ciency losses attributable to them. In the
absence of empirical work, one can hardly conclude that concern over price
signaling distortions is a theoretical nicety that can be safely ignored. Sur-
prisingly enough, signaling behaviors are seldom considered in the literature
on the regulation of externalities. Nevertheless, environmental policy should
be designed to deal with signaling distortions if they were of substantial
magnitude.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Appendix 1: Proof of lemma 1
Subscripts denote partial derivatives. The rst-order condition for prot
maximization is
D(p; ) + pDp(p; )  cq(D(p; ); )Dp(p; ) = 0: (7)
From (2), we get
Dp(p; ) =   (1 + v0(t(R  r)=)t0(R  r)=) 1 : (8)
Substituting for  () in (7) and rearranging terms yields the Lerner index
p() cq(D( p(););)
p() .
The second derivative of the prot function is
pp (p; ) = 2Dp(p; )+pDpp(p; ) cqq(D(p; ); )D2p(p; ) cq(D(p; ); )Dpp(p; ):
(9)
When evaluated at the prot maximizing price, (9) becomes
pp (p
(); ) = 2Dp(p(); )  D(p
(); )
Dp(p(); )
Dpp(p
(); ) cqq(D(p(); ); )D2p(p(); ):
(10)
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From (8),
Dpp(p; ) =  v
00t02 + v0t00
( + v0t0)2
< 0: (11)
Thus, pp (p(); ) < 0, which guarantees that p() is a local maxima.
5.2 Appendix 2: Proof of lemma 2
Had the type  set an equilibrium price ' () 6= p(), then the deviation
to p() would be protable, regardless of whether p() is on or o¤ the
equilibrium path: if p() is on the equilibrium path, then p() = '()
for some  2 [; ) and consumers draw inference  from observing '(),
 ('(); ; ) >  (p(); ; ) since  is the worst belief from condition 2,
and  (p(); ; )   ('(); ; ) by denition of p(); if p() is o¤ the
equilibrium path, then consumersbeliefs are arbitrary after observing p(),
say , and  (p(); ; ) >  (p(); ; )   ('(); ; ).
5.3 Appendix 3: Proof of proposition 1
Consider equilibrium prices set above marginal cost so that condition 2 will be
met in equilibrium. Di¤erentiating (5) with respect to  yields bb (; ) =
 b (; ). Thus, the local second order condition for the maximization
problem is equivalent to b (; )  0, that is,
p ('(); ; )
d'()
d
+ b ('(); ; )  0: (12)
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Using (6) gives
d'()
d

p ('(); ; )  p ('(); ; )
b ('(); ; )b ('(); ; )

 0: (13)
Therefore, the sign of d'()
d
is the same as the sign of the second fac-
tor in the left-hand side of (13), which depends on the monotonicity of
 b

p; ;b =p p; ;b with respect to . From condition 4, the second
factor in the left-hand side of (13) and cq(D(p;b); ) have the same sign.
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